Saturday, September 17, 2022

4b. Fodor, J. (1999) "Why, why, does everyone go on so about thebrain?"

Fodor, J. (1999) "Why, why, does everyone go on so about thebrain?London Review of Books21(19) 68-69. 

I once gave a (perfectly awful) cognitive science lecture at a major centre for brain imaging research. The main project there, as best I could tell, was to provide subjects with some or other experimental tasks to do and take pictures of their brains while they did them. The lecture was followed by the usual mildly boozy dinner, over which professional inhibitions relaxed a bit. I kept asking, as politely as I could manage, how the neuroscientists decided which experimental tasks it would be interesting to make brain maps for. I kept getting the impression that they didn’t much care. Their idea was apparently that experimental data are, ipso facto, a good thing; and that experimental data about when and where the brain lights up are, ipso facto, a better thing than most. I guess I must have been unsubtle in pressing my question because, at a pause in the conversation, one of my hosts rounded on me. ‘You think we’re wasting our time, don’t you?’ he asked. I admit, I didn’t know quite what to say. I’ve been wondering about it ever since.


See also:

Harnad, S. (2019). Can neuroimaging reveal how the brain thinks? In Casting Light on the Dark Side of Brain Imaging (pp. 9-11). Academic Press.

Grill-Spector, K., & Weiner, K. S. (2014). The functional architecture of the ventral temporal cortex and its role in categorizationNature Reviews Neuroscience, 15(8), 536-548.

ABSTRACT: Visual categorization is thought to occur in the human ventral temporal cortex (VTC), but how this categorization is achieved is still largely unknown. In this Review, we consider the computations and representations that are necessary for categorization and examine how the microanatomical and macroanatomical layout of the VTC might optimize them to achieve rapid and flexible visual categorization. We propose that efficient categorization is achieved by organizing representations in a nested spatial hierarchy in the VTC. This spatial hierarchy serves as a neural infrastructure for the representational hierarchy of visual information in the VTC and thereby enables flexible access to category information at several levels of abstraction.



Friday, September 16, 2022

5. Harnad, S. (2003) The Symbol Grounding Problem

Harnad, S. (2003) The Symbol Grounding ProblemEncylopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group. Macmillan.   

or:

Harnad, S. (1990). The symbol grounding problemPhysica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, 42(1), 335-346.

or:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_grounding

The Symbol Grounding Problem is related to the problem of how words get their meanings, and of what meanings are. The problem of meaning is in turn related to the problem of consciousness, or how it is that mental states are meaningful.

 


 If you can't think of anything to skywrite, this might give you some ideas: 
Taddeo, M., & Floridi, L. (2005). Solving the symbol grounding problem: a critical review of fifteen years of research. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 17(4), 419-445. 
Steels, L. (2008) The Symbol Grounding Problem Has Been Solved. So What's Next?
In M. de Vega (Ed.), Symbols and Embodiment: Debates on Meaning and Cognition. Oxford University Press.
Barsalou, L. W. (2010). Grounded cognition: past, present, and futureTopics in Cognitive Science, 2(4), 716-724.
Bringsjord, S. (2014) The Symbol Grounding Problem... Remains Unsolved. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence (in press)

Thursday, September 15, 2022

6a. Harnad, S. (2005) To Cognize is to Categorize: Cognition is Categorization



Harnad, S. (2017) To Cognize is to Categorize: Cognition is Categorization, in Lefebvre, C. and Cohen, H., Eds. Handbook of Categorization (2nd ed.). Elsevier.  

We organisms are sensorimotor systems. The things in the world come in contact with our sensory surfaces, and we interact with them based on what that sensorimotor contact “affords”. All of our categories consist in ways we behave differently toward different kinds of things -- things we do or don’t eat, mate-with, or flee-from, or the things that we describe, through our language, as prime numbers, affordances, absolute discriminables, or truths. That is all that cognition is for, and about.


See also: Jorge Luis Borges Funes the memorious

Wednesday, September 14, 2022

6b. Harnad, S. (2003b) Categorical Perception.

Harnad, S. (2003b) Categorical PerceptionEncyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group. Macmillan. 
Differences can be perceived as gradual and quantitative, as with different shades of gray, or they can be perceived as more abrupt and qualitative, as with different colors. The first is called continuous perception and the second categorical perception. Categorical perception (CP) can be inborn or can be induced by learning. Formerly thought to be peculiar to speech and color perception, CP turns out to be far more general, and may be related to how the neural networks in our brains detect the features that allow us to sort the things in the world into their proper categories, "warping" perceived similarities and differences so as to compress some things into the same category and separate others into different categories.



Pérez-Gay Juárez, F., Sicotte, T., Thériault, C., & Harnad, S. (2019). Category learning can alter perception and its neural correlatesPloS One14(12), e0226000.

Pullum, G. K. (1989). The great Eskimo vocabulary hoax. Natural Language & Linguistic Theory, 275-281.

Tuesday, September 13, 2022

7a. Lewis et al (2017) Evolutionary Psychology

7a. Lewis, D. M., Al-Shawaf, L., Conroy-Beam, D., Asao, K., & Buss, D. M. (2017). Evolutionary psychology: A how-to guide. American Psychologist, 72(4), 353-373.

Researchers in the social and behavioral sciences are increasingly using evolutionary insights to test novel hypotheses about human psychology. Because evolutionary perspectives are relatively new to psychology and most researchers do not receive formal training in this endeavor, there remains ambiguity about “best practices” for implementing evolutionary principles. This article provides researchers with a practical guide for using evolutionary perspectives in their research programs and for avoiding common pitfalls in doing so. We outline essential elements of an evolutionarily informed research program at 3 central phases: (a) generating testable hypotheses, (b) testing empirical predictions, and (c) interpreting results. We elaborate key conceptual tools, including task analysis, psychological mecha- nisms, design features, universality, and cost-benefit analysis. Researchers can use these tools to generate hypotheses about universal psychological mechanisms, social and cultural inputs that amplify or attenuate the activation of these mechanisms, and cross-culturally variable behavior that these mechanisms can produce. We hope that this guide inspires theoretically and methodologically rigorous research that more cogently integrates knowledge from the psychological and life sciences. 




Monday, September 12, 2022

7b. Cauchoix, M., & Chaine, A. S. (2016). How can we study the evolution of animal minds?

7b. Cauchoix, M., & Chaine, A. S. (2016). How can we study the evolution of animal minds? Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 358.



During the last 50 years, comparative cognition and neurosciences have improved our understanding of animal minds while evolutionary ecology has revealed how selection acts on traits through evolutionary time. We describe how cognition can be subject to natural selection like any other biological trait and how this evolutionary approach can be used to understand the evolution of animal cognition. We recount how comparative and fitness methods have been used to understand the evolution of cognition and outline how these approaches could extend our understanding of cognition. The fitness approach, in particular, offers unprecedented opportunities to study the evolutionary mechanisms responsible for variation in cognition within species and could allow us to investigate both proximate (i.e., neural and developmental) and ultimate (i.e., ecological and evolutionary) underpinnings of animal cognition together. We highlight recent studies that have successfully shown that cognitive traits can be under selection, in particular by linking individual variation in cognition to fitness. To bridge the gap between cognitive variation and fitness consequences and to better understand why and how selection can occur on cognition, we end this review by proposing a more integrative approach to study contemporary selection on cognitive traits combining socio-ecological data, minimally invasive neuroscience methods and measurement of ecologically relevant behaviors linked to fitness. Our overall goal in this review is to build a bridge between cognitive neuroscientists and evolutionary biologists, illustrate how their research could be complementary, and encourage evolutionary ecologists to include explicit attention to cognitive processes in their studies of behavior.

Sunday, September 11, 2022

8a. Pinker, S. & Bloom, P. (1990). Natural language and natural selection

Pinker, S. & Bloom, P. (1990). Natural language and natural selectionBehavioral and Brain Sciences13(4): 707-784. 

Many people have argued that the evolution of the human language faculty cannot be explained by Darwinian natural selection. Chomsky and Gould have suggested that language may have evolved as the by‐product of selection for other abilities or as a consequence of as‐yet unknown laws of growth and form. Others have argued that a biological specialization for grammar is incompatible with every tenet of Darwinian theory ‐‐ that it shows no genetic variation, could not exist in any intermediate forms, confers no selective advantage, and would require more evolutionary time and genomic space than is available. We examine these arguments and show that they depend on inaccurate assumptions about biology or language or both. Evolutionary theory offers clear criteria for when a trait should be attributed to natural selection: complex design for some function, and the absence of alternative processes capable of explaining such complexity. Human language meets this criterion: grammar is a complex mechanism tailored to the transmission of propositional structures through a serial interface. Autonomous and arbitrary grammatical phenomena have been offered as counterexamples to the position that language is an adaptation, but this reasoning is unsound: communication protocols depend on arbitrary conventions that are adaptive as long as they are shared. Consequently, language acquisition in the child should systematically differ from language evolution in the species and attempts to analogize them are misleading. Reviewing other arguments and data, we conclude that there is every reason to believe that a specialization for grammar evolved by a conventional neo‐Darwinian process.

Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (2018). Thirty years of great ape gestures. Animal Cognition, 1-9.

Graham, Kirsty E; Catherine Hobaiter, James Ounsley, Takeshi Furuichi, Richard W. Byrne (2018) Bonobo and chimpanzee gestures overlap extensively in meaning. PLoS Biology





PSYC 538 Syllabus

Categorization, Communication and Consciousness 2022 Time : FRIDAYS 8:30-11:25  Place : BIRKS 203 Instructor : Stevan Harnad Office : Zoom E...