7b. Cauchoix, M., & Chaine, A. S. (2016). How can we study the evolution of animal minds? Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 358.
During the last 50 years, comparative cognition and neurosciences have improved our understanding of animal minds while evolutionary ecology has revealed how selection acts on traits through evolutionary time. We describe how cognition can be subject to natural selection like any other biological trait and how this evolutionary approach can be used to understand the evolution of animal cognition. We recount how comparative and fitness methods have been used to understand the evolution of cognition and outline how these approaches could extend our understanding of cognition. The fitness approach, in particular, offers unprecedented opportunities to study the evolutionary mechanisms responsible for variation in cognition within species and could allow us to investigate both proximate (i.e., neural and developmental) and ultimate (i.e., ecological and evolutionary) underpinnings of animal cognition together. We highlight recent studies that have successfully shown that cognitive traits can be under selection, in particular by linking individual variation in cognition to fitness. To bridge the gap between cognitive variation and fitness consequences and to better understand why and how selection can occur on cognition, we end this review by proposing a more integrative approach to study contemporary selection on cognitive traits combining socio-ecological data, minimally invasive neuroscience methods and measurement of ecologically relevant behaviors linked to fitness. Our overall goal in this review is to build a bridge between cognitive neuroscientists and evolutionary biologists, illustrate how their research could be complementary, and encourage evolutionary ecologists to include explicit attention to cognitive processes in their studies of behavior.
During the last 50 years, comparative cognition and neurosciences have improved our understanding of animal minds while evolutionary ecology has revealed how selection acts on traits through evolutionary time. We describe how cognition can be subject to natural selection like any other biological trait and how this evolutionary approach can be used to understand the evolution of animal cognition. We recount how comparative and fitness methods have been used to understand the evolution of cognition and outline how these approaches could extend our understanding of cognition. The fitness approach, in particular, offers unprecedented opportunities to study the evolutionary mechanisms responsible for variation in cognition within species and could allow us to investigate both proximate (i.e., neural and developmental) and ultimate (i.e., ecological and evolutionary) underpinnings of animal cognition together. We highlight recent studies that have successfully shown that cognitive traits can be under selection, in particular by linking individual variation in cognition to fitness. To bridge the gap between cognitive variation and fitness consequences and to better understand why and how selection can occur on cognition, we end this review by proposing a more integrative approach to study contemporary selection on cognitive traits combining socio-ecological data, minimally invasive neuroscience methods and measurement of ecologically relevant behaviors linked to fitness. Our overall goal in this review is to build a bridge between cognitive neuroscientists and evolutionary biologists, illustrate how their research could be complementary, and encourage evolutionary ecologists to include explicit attention to cognitive processes in their studies of behavior.
I expected to connect this reading with psychology courses I had previously taken that briefly mentioned evolutionary approaches to psychological explanations. On the other hand, I was pleasantly surprised to notice links with my Environment minor as well, especially in the second case study presented in the paper about brood parasitism. I studied this phenomenon from a purely evolutionary perspective last year, notably discussing how it may lead to coevolution between 2 species (the parasite and the host), through an arms race of trait evolution. However, this reading introduced a cognitive perspective on these traits that I did not expect, by pointing to the cognitive relevance of recognizing and rejecting the parasite egg for the host species, as well as that of mimicking the host egg for the parasite species. Although this is just an example that may not be as relevant to others who didn’t study it in class, it really brought home the relevance of investigating the evolutionary process of cognitive trait selection.
ReplyDeleteAmélie, what, if anything, distinguishes cognitive traits from other traits?
DeleteMy intuition is that cognitive traits, unlike other traits, are not observable, and in animals particularly are harder to test. We can’t have a conversation with a bird about its episodic memories from 2 weeks ago, but we can watch their mating habits. We can only estimate cognitive abilities, through the lens of animal behaviour, whereas other traits are measurable and observable. The authors argue the cognitive traits are likely the driving force behind most of the behavioural traits, and we should attempt to study them in similar ways, specifically using the fitness approach to measure current, evolved cognitive traits.
DeleteI disagree with your view that cognitive traits are that distinct from other traits. While cognitive traits may be internal processes, they elicit directly observable and measurable behaviours. Thus, in this way, they are no different from other traits.
DeleteIn other words, you do not need a "yes or no" response from a bird to determine if it has episodic memory. The fact that repeated exposure changes its behaviour and learns is quite a valid enough measure.
Organisms have cognitive traits and vegetative traits, with a fuzzy (i.e., arbitrary) border between the two. Most traits have both a genetic and an experiential component. There are morphological traits (size, shape, color), mostly vegetative and observable. And there are behavioral traits (what the organism DOES), also observable.
DeleteCogsci is concerned with behavioral traits, but less with what the organism DOES than with what organisms CAN DO. Cogsci tries to reverse-engineer how and why organisms can do what they can do.
Emma,
DeleteThough cognitive traits elicit observable behaviours, the relationship between the two is purely correlative, just like between MNs and mirror capacities. As a vegetative behavioural trait, we may understand how and why sweat glands evolved to keep our body temperature levelled for survival purposes. However, even Evo psych does not explain how we are able to decide to turn on the AC when the room gets too hot. Though "turning on the AC" is an observable behaviour, it does not address the cognitive state behind it because you could turn on the AC for various reasons that may have nothing to do with "feeling hot." The "AC" example shows that a cognitive trait is only indirectly measurable (unlike vegetative traits), just like the Turing Test's goal of inferring the presence of cognition by measuring observable cognitive capacities. However, at this point, we all know that cognition goes far beyond the scope of observability. With that said, cognitive trait is definitely different from other behavioural traits.
Dear All, please remember to send me the Word file of your cut-pasted skywritings from Week 1 to 6 this week.
ReplyDeleteThe lack of communication between evolutionary theories and cognitive neuroscience has led to differentiated techniques and a gap in the proximate and ultimate understandings of animal behaviors. This paper investigates the ways in which an integration of both perspectives could be done, particularly through the fitness approach. Doing so would provide us with an overview of the evolution of cognitive abilities as we study them now, in turn enabling a further understanding of cognition in general. Indeed, the authors argue that a better understanding of various cognitive processes in their various contexts can be gained through an analysis of the problems they were meant to solve in the first place. This would entail understanding the evolutionary dynamics and the specific contexts which have led cognitive processes to develop differently in different systems and different environments. I found the example of memory very interesting: memory used for food storage may work differently between different species depending on their needs. Moreover, memory can also work in different ways within a particular specie: understanding the purpose of, for example, spatial and working memory, might help us apprehend these cognitive abilities more accurately.
ReplyDeleteMathilda, there is no doubt that evolution is helpful in explaining species differences in cognitive capacities, but what evolutionary explanations are helpful in explaining human cognitive traits?
DeleteEvolutionary explanations that assess the role of cognition in the value of ecological intelligence (ex. the ability to locate and extract food through spatial memory), social intelligence (ex. ability to negotiate and form successful relationships that are beneficial to survival) and as buffers against environmental challenges through developing context-appropriate behaviours (ex. ability to thrive in novel environments) suggest the existence of evolutionary pressures that could create pressure on cognitive evolution.
DeleteNo doubt, as humans we have had to adapt to many different environments each with new obstacles or status quos to follow in order to maximize our chances of survival or what now is more likely considered, improving our standard of survival. Perhaps modern day examples could be as follows
- ecological intelligence: ability to remember where the cheap grocery stores are
- social intelligence: the ability to display approachableness and exercise networking capabilities ensure greater opportunities for success
- buffers to new environments: you find the easiest way to commute to mcgill requiring the least amount of effort after moving here for the first time
Laura, yes, some of your examples of contemporary human capacities might originate from specific genetically coded capacities that evolved as adaptations to specific ancestral conditions in our ancestors (nonhuman and human). Or they could be the result of more general cognitive capacities, likewise evolved because of their adaptive value in many different conditions. Whether specific abilities or general ones, the question, for cogsci, is, how might their adaptive origin and function help explain how to reverse-engineer their underlying cognitive mechanisms. (“Intelligence” is just a weasel-word for cognitive capacity: the capacity to DO certain kinds of things.)
DeleteRepost:
DeleteTo answer "what evolutionary explanations are helpful in explaining human cognitive traits?"
The paper proposes three hypotheses as the primary factors behind differences in cognitive function across species. There is the idea that cognition evolved from valuing ecological intelligence, the skills to gather food and manage variation in food. There is also the theory that cognition evolved from valuing social intelligence, the ability to manage and succeed in relationships. Lastly, there is the buffer hypotheses, the idea that cognition evolved to help individuals against new environmental challenges. These hypotheses all provide possible explanations behind our powerful cognitive capacities.
Those with higher ecological intelligence would be favored because, as hunter gathers as we were in the past, it is incredibly valuable to be good at finding and extracting food in different environments. Those with higher social intelligence would be favored because humans are incredibly reliant on one another, those who are excluded from social groups have a more difficulty in survival. Since humans were previously nomadic groups, those that adapted quickly to new environments would be favored in survival.
Understanding the origin behind our cognitive traits might help us figure out cognitive mechanisms because it points to a purpose behind why a certain cognitive ability was pressured to improve. By studying these more specific functions, we might get a clue to what cognitive capacities came first and through that, understand how they influence our other growing cognitive abilities as time went on.
This paper got me reflecting about the relation between hippocampal size and the number of neurons in a brain to the development of spatial memory. Indeed, smaller insects such as bees or ants have really good spatial memory as they are able to find their way back to their home (hive or hill). Yet, their hippocampus size and their number of neurons are not comparable to that of any other animal or even human. Ants have 250 000 neurons in their brains compared to 100 billion brain cells for humans. Since localization is such a big part of their cognitive functions and their brain is relatively small, hippocampus size alone cannot account for their cognitive ability to localize themselves. Surely, there must be something else that allows them to navigate the world so well. How can a species with such a small brain and hippocampus have such a developed sense of spatial memory?
ReplyDeleteI think one idea might reside in collective thinking and the sharing of information amongst members of the hive. But even then, how can their communication, and all the specific cognitive functions that pertain to their species, be so advanced with a brain smaller than a sesame seed?
That could have some interesting implications for studying cognitive architecture and functional organization. If we assume that we can solve the 'easy problem' via reverse engineering, then it stands to reason that intelligence doesn't need to be seated in a unified brain structure. This also lends credence to the theories discussed in the paper, especially reproduction driven cost-benefit analyses. The development of a eusocial cognitive mechanism is an enormous investment, but it can be explained in terms of the reproductive efficiency found in centralization (i.e. through a queen).
DeleteI agree with Jacob that intelligence does not need to be seated in a unified brain structure or size as these aspects of our brain are the result of cost-benefit adaptation. Furthermore, the size of an animal's brain is not proportional to how "intelligent" it is nor to how specialized its abilities are, but is a reflection of how big the animal is, what diet it consumes, how social it is, and, overall, how much perceptual information it needs to integrate to be able to do the things it can do. Perhaps, as the 7b reading states, we can discover more about human cognitive capacity by analyzing functional connectivity and specific circuits in the brain. However, this pursuit does not necessarily uncover how such neural connections and circuits produce behavioural capacity (i.e., we fall into the trap of the functional localization studies that Fodor deplores). Unfortunately, I can't see how the Fitness Approach (the theory that short term selection is the primary cause of evolution) would not run into this same functional localization problem... The only way I can see the Fitness Approach helping us is if we hypothesize that it is unnecessary to know how our brain structure produces cognitive capacity when aiming to reverse engineer cognitive capacity (i.e., embrace behaviourism), but this feels anti-cognitive-science as it ignores the contributions of neuroanatomical research.
DeleteÉtienne, the functional role of the number of neurons will only become a concrete question when we have reverse-engineered how the brain is doing what it can do. Right now it is just speculation. We are surprised that bees can do so many things with so few neurons, but we don’t know how the neurons do it.
DeleteJacob, distributed function -- distributed among neurons and distributed among organisms (as in the models for swarming behavior) -- might turn out to be relevant.
Polly, good points. Other comments have also noticed some similarities between Week 4 and Week 7.
In this reading, Cauchoix and Chaine highlight two ways to investigate the evolution of cognitive processes in animals: the comparative approach and the fitness approach. The comparative approach focuses on the evolutionary history. The fitness approach examines contemporary selection. They argue that both are necessary to study the evolution of cognitive abilities which could allow to better understand cognition.
ReplyDeleteI found the example of brood parasites really interesting. Arms race in brood parasite related to egg mimicry push host recognition system to identify parasites. The accuracy of identification depends on visual discrimination abilities. Physiological and cognitive limitations influence the detection capacities. Recent studies have also demonstrated the importance of environmental pressure on the development of capacities in accordance with the brood’s needs. Indeed, a specific region of the hippocampus is enlarged in parasitic species relative to others. This suggests that brain regions may have evolved to manage the specific needs of brood parasites relative to other spatial memory. This shows how the fitness approach is also needed to link ecological context to the evolution of cognitive abilities and neural structure. Thus, it would be interesting to think about what parallels could be made with human cognition.
Cauchoix and Chaine also point out that "the relationship between cognition and complex behaviors is not always straight forward making it difficult to directly link fitness and cognitive performances."
DeleteIn other words, there may exist a link, but its viability is dismantled by the complexities of cognition. It's interesting to consider the reasons behind this.
The way I see it: cognition is on a spectrum, with very basic organisms on one side (Drosophila, etc) and humans on the other. The closer you get to the human side, the more variables get thrown into the equation of trying to resolve "proximate" and "ultimate" causes for behavior. The human mind is just way more nuanced. Therefore, to address your point about what parallels could be made with human cognition, I think it's really difficult to make any credible parallels at all.
Ines, the relevance of either approach to cogsci depends on whether it helps to reverse-engineer the underlying cognitive mechanisms.
DeleteTeegan, is the spectrum you envision a vegetative-to-cognitive one? Or specific-to-general one?
I would say vegetative to cognitive. I learned in a neuroscience class once that fruit flies are capable of learning, which is very interesting, but I think we can mostly agree that the learning happening is not on par with human cognition. Most of the time, fruit flies are performing almost purely vegetative functions with the end goal of reproducing and propogating the species. Evolutionarily, I feel this makes studying fruit flies a lot more straightforward than studying humans, who not only reproduce and propogate their species, but also create art, commit crimes, fall in love, etc.
DeleteThe fitness approach argues for the contextualization of behaviors that are studied in the field of psychology through understanding why they have evolved in the first place. While this approach can be helpful in cognitive science's understanding of why we have certain capacities, this approach again does not help to explain how organisms are able to do what they are capable of doing (the second component of the Easy Problem), as we are still left studying behaviors, and not how we are able to execute them.
ReplyDeleteI like your tie in of the easy problem and how it relates to the fitness approach!
DeleteYes, the question is how "why" can help explain 'how."
DeleteIt’s interesting to think whether the food caching birds have a larger hippocampus due to evolution, in which case natural selection would select those that could better remember where they’ve cached their food, or if their hippocampi actually grow in the process of exercising this ability throughout their lifetime. It could be a bit of both, as research has found that the volume of hippocampi in humans grow when we are forced to exercise our memory ability, such as in London Taxi drivers. Research described in Anders Erikson’s book, Peak: Secrets from The New Science of Expertise, has also described that when people become an expert at something, such as mastering the violin, the amount of white matter in their brain increases, particularly in the areas that are critical for their violin playing. Brain plasticity is common in animals as well and I wonder to what extent food caching birds’ memory capacity could be explained by this brain plasticity or by evolution.
ReplyDeleteBut do these size correlations help explain how the brain does it?
DeleteIt's important for the birds (the hosts) that are being parasitized by cowbirds and brood parasites to be able to recognize the difference between their eggs and those of the parasites. Therefore, we can say that there’s evolutionary pressure for the birds to recognize the parasite as well, so that they can increase their vigilance when spotted in the environment. However, there is a risk that when the birds begin to kick out parasite eggs, that they end up kicking out their own, so there is a cost-benefit situation, where they have to be extra careful. This brings us back to categorization, where we would assume that they would benefit from a strong ability to distinguish their eggs from parasite eggs, and there are consequences for each decision. If they kick out only the eggs that are not theirs, they will receive positive feedback, in that they will only have to take care of their offspring and not have to deal with the added parental load. If they kick out some of their own eggs accidentally, they will be wasting their effort on raising parasite offspring, while killing their own, which is obviously the wrong outcome. Consequently, evolution must have made sure that they get this right, and increased categorization capacities specifically with their eggs probably were the result of this pressure.
ReplyDeleteEvolution is lazy, and cannot focus on an individual bird, or on finding the "best possible" solution. As Herbert Simon suggested, it does not optimize; it just "satisfices" -- settling on a good enough solution, with some flexibility for variable challenges.
DeleteThis reading outlines the current approaches in studying cognitive evolution in organisms, and clearly lists the three hypotheses surrounding the subject which are as follows: cognition involved due to a) the value of ecological intelligence, b) the value of social intelligence, or c) as a buffer to individuals against environmental challenges by producing appropriate behaviours in new environments/contexts. There is evidence supported all three of the hypotheses as there have been correlated with brain size and diet along with brain size and social group size, indicating brain size being influenced by both social and ecological factors. There has also been correlation of better survival in novel environments among species with larger brain sizes which supports the cognitive buffer hypothesis. Despite these findings, large brains are not necessary in order to complete complex cognitive tasks (as demonstrated by insects like ants). As mentioned above (by Darcy), the fitness approach has been proposed as a promising method to take into account the varying factors that may affect cognitive evolution but, it has not been significantly implemented in studies. Other proposed methods to studying intra-specific variation and close the lapse in communication between cognitive scientists and behavioural ecologists was to study animals in captivity and conduct more neuroimaging studies. However, this reminds me of our discussion on mirror neuron discovery and causes me to pose the same question: does the localization of function truly help with reverse-engineering or further our knowledge in an effective way?
ReplyDeleteKarina, it is not yet known how the number of neurons is related to cognitive capacity. Crows’ brains have turned out to be able to do things we thought only mammalian brains could do; some insects have been able to do them too.
DeleteChittka, L. (2022). The Mind of a Bee. Princeton University Press.
You are right that there are parallels between Week 4 and Week 7 when it comes to reverse-engineering cognitive capacity.
This reading seems to argue for the “fitness approach,” a way to study cognitive and evolutionary mechanisms intertwined. The goal is to determine certain cognitive abilities to explain behaviors connected to the natural selection process through evolution. This approach strives to find the underlying cognitive reasons for behavior and how animals adapt to their environment: “understanding why cognition evolves will also require us to directly link cognitive performance to ecological challenges that the animals face in their natural environment” (Cauchoix & Chaine 2016).
ReplyDeleteThough this might explain part of cognition, the authors do not discuss some of the behavior we human animals indulge in that are not beneficial to our survival (such as smoking or suicide for example). Therefore, though it seems this way of research could partially helpful, I don’t see how it would be possible for it to address all types of human behavior (the why and how of all that humans can do).
Hi Kayla! You’re right that this reading does not address why humans engage in behaviours that are not beneficial to survival. However, I believe that the fitness approach can help psychologists recognize and distinguish adaptive behaviours from maladaptive behaviours. By examining behaviour from this perspective, it can help us characterize traits that may qualify as mental disorders due to their maladaptive nature. Maladaptiveness is considered to be one of the primary markers of abnormality and psychopathology. Although some examples are more mild in nature (ex: smoking), some are very harmful to quality of life and survival (ex: addiction, suicide).
DeleteWhat cognitive capacities can evolutionary explanation help us to reverse-engineer? They are more likely to be involved in learning and language than in smoking and suicide – although there are addiction-like compulsions in scientific and artistic creativity, perhaps even in learning.
DeleteThis paper highlights the breadth of cognitive abilities held by different species, fueled by different environmental pressures and different means for survival. It narrows on two approaches that can help explain cognitive abilities of animals, and bounces off of both the comparative and fitness in order to draw parallels with human evolution. It discusses brain size variability based on things like diet and social group size, which emphasizes that social drivers are relevant in cognitive development. Considering the role of social intelligence in cognitive evolution, I wonder whether personality is taken into account in cognitive abilities. In my affective neuroscience class, we read a study by Forkosh et al. (2019) in which they captured stable personality traits in mice that drove behavior and certain cognitive behaviors like memory. What do we make of these, and how can these traits be explained by cognitive evolution?
ReplyDeleteHi Tess! I am taking a personality class this semester, and I'm glad you raised this question. Personality traits are about how we think and behave and are most important in social situations. From an evolutionary standpoint, more extroverted, agreeable people are more likely to be appraised by others, perhaps giving them better reputations. This gives them better chances to survive, allowing them to pass down their genes and personality traits.
DeleteHowever, many assume parenting styles lead to offspring's personalities, an example being that more agreeable parents tend to have more agreeable children. There have been numerous studies around whether personality traits (the Big5, for example) are hereditary. Based on observational differences between monozygotic and dizygotic twins, the current conclusion is that 50% of our traits are genetic, but that is not to say environment contributes to the other half. Measurement errors and confounding variables take up a large portion of the differences in measurement. Therefore, it is highly likely that personality traits have an evolutionary explanation as well.
Tess, evolution is lazy; it prefers to leave to learning what can be learned, rather than building it in in advance, genetically and neurally. Not only is this cheaper but it’s much more flexible and adaptble. The same is true of individual differences in capacity: multiple genotype variants, with different blends of strengths, is more flexible than one rigid genotype. The principle is similar to the one underlying recombinant DNA.
DeleteJenny, lazy evolution’s best bet is flexibility in both cases: learnability as well as individual variation in personality traits.
This reading clarified how evolutionary psychology is less concerned with "how" than cognitive science. Explaining "how" calls for reverse-engineering of causal mechanisms. Evolution can only (sometimes) explain "why" -- what was the adaptive advantage provided by the cognitive capacity and how did it evolve? -- but not how the genes or the brain actually produce the capacity. However, explaining both how and why is part of cognitive sciences' "easy" problem.
ReplyDeleteThat's it.
DeleteThe authors mention 3 criteria we must satisfy to show that a particular trait has evolved under natural selection.
ReplyDelete"A trait [in this case, a cognitive function] will evolve if (1) there is variability in cognition between individuals, (2) that this variability in cognitive performances is heritable, and (3) that this variation is related to variance in fitness (survival, reproductive success) under specific environmental conditions."
My question for you all is whether you think consciousness ("feeling", "qualia", or whatever else you want to call it) fulfill these criteria. (1) Is there variability in felt states among individuals and species? (and what would that even mean, here?) (2) Is this variability inherited? (3) In what way, if at all, having felt states lead to an increase in fitness (mating, survival, etc.)?
Broadly speaking, this begs the question of what causal roles felt states could have over and above cerebral or computational states. Honestly, I do not have even an inkling of an answer to that.
Hi Gabriel, I think consciousness can have a very broad definition. My response would be the following, for (1): it's the other-minds problem, you can't correctly infer other's state of mind, therefore; hard to tell the variability. e.g., a dolphin might have a complete different type consciousness compared to us because of the very different environmental and social situations. (2) it should be heritable (3) it makes sense that that's the case, but there are other variations in this as well.
DeleteI agree with Monica that consciousness is a very broad term. And if it’s about qualitative consciousness, aka. conscious experience, it would be the other-minds problem, which would not be solvable. But I think it is a very interesting question since, among all of the traits over the planet, consciousness is rarely studied in the context of evolution. I think consciousness is necessary for survival and evolved like other traits. If they evolved, then it has to be inheritable in some way from a long-term evolutionary perspective. The reason is consciousness gives us the capability to determine what’s going on in our surroundings, what’s happening to us, and what choices we have in the world (because we’re awake and self-aware). Thus, it’s the essential mechanism for the survival of life. It can be a driving force in evolution and improve the cognitive process of animals.
DeleteIn my view, it seems *possible* for an organism to have the cognitive capabilities detailed in the article but not a vivid sense of subjective experience. If consciousness isn't inherently necessary I think this plays into the idea expressed elsewhere on this thread and the last that evolutionary psychology can potentially help explain some of the "why" as relates to the easy problem (specified on the last thread by Stevan as "reverse-engineering how and why organisms are able to do the things they can do"), but cannot come close to bearing in much of an effective way at all on the hard problem at present. If consciousness does have identifiable selection pressures as relate to specific adaptational benefits, though, then in principle evolutionary psychology should have similar benefits to the hard problem as to the easy problem, but only to a point (the "why" moreso than the "how").
DeleteI don't know if we have enough of a grasp of what consciousness is, how it happens, what it's for etc. to determine whether it fits these criteria. An important consideration for te variation criteria is not the variation in felt states between individuals or species who all, but the initial variation that had to occur between organisms who had felt states and those that didn't. Without having some ideas as to what the initial adaptive advantage of this variation was, the adaptive advantage of variations in felt states is difficult to talk about. There is also the problem of what variation in felt-states vs non-feeling states even looked like when it emerged as a phenotypic variation. It seems like feeling vs not feeling is a pretty hard binary with little in between: you either feel something, whatever that may be, or nothing.
DeleteThat article about animal’s cognitive abilities show us that there are many reasons why some behaviours or characteristics are present in animals and others did not survive. Fitting in the environment is crucial for survival. For example, it is written: “Hippocampus size, however, varies predictably with the need for excellent spatial memory in brood parasites. Brood parasites have an enlarged hippocampus in the breeding season (Clayton et al., 1997), the sex that searches for nests tends to have a larger hippocampus than the other sex”. Here, the fact that the sex that searches for nests tends to have a larger hippocampus than the other sex is important because it is linked to the reproductive behaviour which is responsible for the survival of the species. However, the article really focuses on the why some cognitive features are present what role they fulfill, but it doesn’t really answers the question of “how” it happens, like how animals do things that they do. Also, when we look at humans, compared to animals, not everything looks necessary for survival. For example, why do humans like watching movies? Why do they like meditating? Is there a reason for doing these things?
ReplyDeleteI think there is a difference between the WHY certain traits evolved and the actual explanation of how it's done. I don't know if whether this paper is trying to talk about the WHY or the HOW. I certainly think there are some validity in believing evolutionary psychology does give us explanation of some traits/capacities we have, but may be not in cognition. The fitness benefits of cognition is just too easily applied to both humans and non-human animals. Fitness is about the species, not the strongest traits, I like the example that we may have advanced cognition because we lack strong physical strengths and capacities for our species, i.e., we need something else since to survive since we don't have the strength.
ReplyDeleteThis is an important distinction that I also came to when reading the article. Evolutionary psychology/the fitness approach helps understand the WHY question but does not always address the how. Nonetheless, these approaches help establish starting points for the HOW question by allowing a broadened view of cognition across all species and time.
DeleteHi Monica,
DeleteI think the article does talk a lot more about why than how. But I think that the short answer to 'how' is just Darwinian natural selection: The animals with the traits that lead to a lower level of fitness merely die or fail to attract mates thus having none or less offspring. Certain traits evolve because some individuals with them survive better or can raise more offspring than individuals without them. Also, the relationship between physical traits and cognitive traits may be very obvious (e.g., the size of the hippocampus and spatial memory in brood parasites), then the natural selection of physical traits could mean a natural selection of cognitive traits at the same time.
Actually, giving this topic a second thought, sometimes the WHY isn't so clear because some traits have no purpose, they are not always developed because it's not always teleological. A good example of this is the biological structures in female hyena vs male hyena. There are also piggyback traits that are evolved to solve another problem and just hung around.
DeleteThe cognitive mechanisms that brood parasites utilize, let alone avian brood parasites are simply fascinating. What could have led these species to develop such cognitive capacities? And even more curiously, how did the non-parasitic species' hosts evolve their categorical perceptual skills to differentiate their eggs from others? And those who successfully did, how were they able to pass down these "evolved traits" down their lineage? The answers to these questions may never truly be known simply because these changes happened over millions of years.
ReplyDeleteAs some previous comments have mentioned previously, evolutionary psychology does not seek to answer the same questions as cognitive science does. We can understand the causal mechanisms for why some species evolved in the way that they did. But we cannot explain how they evolved this way.
This reading gives valuable insights about how cognition may have developed and how it can be subject to natural selection in species. In the introduction section, a particular sentence caught my attention: “evolutionary biologists and behavioural ecologists have been primarily interested in the ecology and evolution of behavior without examining the cognitive mechanisms underlying these behaviours”, which reminded me of the lectures where we talked about behaviorists and Hebb had an interesting point that he made: he was the first who suggested that behaviorism was important, but he also said that what’s important is not describing the behavior; behavior is important because it is our data. The important thing is explaining how the behavior is generated by what’s going on inside the organism and the brain. Perhaps, evolutionary biologists and behavioural ecologists were also missing this point, they were not observing the causal mechanisms that generate a particular behavior, but only focusing on the outcomes of a behavior.
ReplyDeleteThe "fitness approach" - as explained in the reading - offers us the chance to integrate our proximate understanding of cognition with new findings on the "ultimate causes of cognitive evolution." Taking on this approach helps us understand that there may be a multitude of variables that select for a given cognitive ability and "in some cases these factors might not act in concert."
ReplyDeleteWhile this approach can help us answer some questions for cognitive science, the ultimate motivations in what the fitness approach is trying to explain does not completely align with addressing the "how" of reverse-engineering within cognitive science, as it does (to a certain extent) of the "why".
I agree with you that the fitness approach is not directly addressing the “how” goal of reverse-engineering. For the connection made between behavioral capacity and connective circuits of the brain are not shown as directly “how” one can cause the other. I am interested in the areas you find the approach aligns with the “why” of human capacity. The approach I didn’t think was tending to causal mechanisms but shaped by ‘cognitive’ behaviors. My idea was that if a T3 robot was evaluated based off findings expressed in this paper and similar findings, what would the authors conclude about the robots cognition. I think from a cog sci standpoint there would be things to learn from the T3 robot, but from the evolutionary biology/cognitive neuroscience standpoint there would be nothing interesting to learn from the robot.
DeleteHi Sara and Sepand, I agree that the fitness approach doesn't quite provide a satisfactory lead for the "why" question of cogsci. As the author explains, the fitness approach matches cognitive performance with brain mechanisms studied in animals, in relation to their needs given their environmental conditions. Highly social corvids, for example, tend to have better results in tasks requiring social learning; they seem to have evolved to have social behaviours. Can't this be classified as the same type of explanation for why giraffes have long necks? This paper doesn't address why it is necessary to have conscious feedback to begin with, rather it looks at the relationship between agents of selection and cognitive behaviours.
DeleteI found this reading to be extremely interesting and insightful! The discussion of different case studies really emphasized just how important it is to integrate both proximate and ultimate understandings of cognition when studying the human mind. It seems trivial after having read the article, but before I had not thought about how animal food patterns can affect memory capabilities in different species. In one experiment, the researchers hypothesized that non-hoarding species would score lower in spatial memory tasks than food hoarding species. However, they quickly realized that comparative studies need to be INTRA-specific to provide reliable data. It is not logical to compare two completely different species on spatial memory abilities… if anything, they realized (in the case of the chickadees) that looking at the SAME species but in different ecological environments would provide more accurate data on how food collecting patterns affect spatial memory capacities. It made me think about how often we perform studies on non-human animals in hopes of understanding the human brain and its evolution. This article gives us clear examples of the flaws of comparative analyses when it happens between two completely different species, and it brings forth an important principle that we may need to follow more in our future studies of the brain.
ReplyDeleteAnother refocus the authors suggest is how comparative studies should shift away from brain size to instead focus on neural circuits involved in cognition since size is not a sufficient proxy for cognitive function using the hippocampus as an example. To be honest it’s a little weird to me that researchers followed this notion of size equating to increased function for so long because as we've learned, many traits can be maximized with small size that may in fact aid in cognitive functions.
DeleteAlso, we know that evolution favours efficiency and usually, this is associated with shorter pathways of communication (or the shortest possible pathway) which can aid in better transmittance of information across different regions of the brain and can result in the brain developing mechanisms that maximize on informational efficiency which would not require regions be so large. It's honestly surprising that this paper which was published quite recently has to advocate for studying neural circuits involved in cognitive functioning as opposed to size.
As many have pointed out before, this reading reveals much about cognition and its evolution through time and how it may be due to how it survived. It's very interesting to think about whether cognitive capacities that could play a role in mate choice. As said in the article, many have been interested ecology and evolution of behavior without investigating the cognitive mechanisms that are manipulating the behaviours. The domino effect from having slight changes in cognitive capabilities that could lead behaviours and thus different mating all together is a small change into a larger one.
ReplyDeleteThis reading describes a way to combine the fields of evolutionary ecology and cognitive neuroscience to provide a way of understanding some of why certain species have developed the cognitive capacities they have. The paper also makes a distinction between proximal and distal causes of behaviour. However, as a couple previous skywritings have pointed out, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the two, especially in human behaviour. This means that it is hard to tell what aspects of our behaviour are evolutionarily determined and which are influenced by the organism’s immediate environment, especially since we can have the tendency to discount social causes of behaviour. As such, I think that cognitive ecology and the fitness model are good models that can be used to create hypotheses for further behavioural experiments, but that one should be careful when suggesting that certain behaviours arise from evolution.
ReplyDeleteI find the purpose of this article interesting, being that the aim was to close the bridge between the two types of behaviour (cog/neurosci and ecological/evolutionary). It somewhat surprises me that the two were that separated to begin with as I find that they often tie together, particularly in the example of the bi-parental breeding songbirds. It makes a lot of sense to me that mate choice requires cognitive perceptive functions and includes all of the information available and is made by decision making mechanisms, however I have rarely seen this type of information taught in past ecology classes.
ReplyDeleteAs previously stated, this reading provided a unique perspective on what we had previously read. In particular, compared to previous readings, this reading was more focused on biology rather than topics that relate to computation. Moreover, it was quite interesting to see a more in-depth paper related to the development of cognition and natural selection - topics that I haven't fully studied/seen in other classes.
ReplyDeleteWith this in mind, the paper defines cognition in relation to the current view of the animal mind, i.e., “the current view for cognitive neuroscientists is that the animal mind emerges from brain activity as the neural machinery encodes, manipulates, stores and recalls information, which is together called ‘cognition.’” Here, they go on to discuss the “various cognitive functions that are a key component of information processing to which they play a significant role in ecologically relevant tendencies studied by behavioural ecologists”.
One of the functions spoken of was executive functions. In this case, even though I'm not sure if there is a connection or if I'm relating the reading's ideas to other ideas that pique my interest correctly, I'd still like to bring up the subject of bilingualism. As noted, there is often this idea that those who can speak more languages have better executive functioning. I was just wondering from here how exactly this may have become a result of an evolutionary trait. Such that, animals clearly have their own language, but it is not as developed as ours (or maybe it is and I’m underestimating the language of animals). However, I was just curious as to how our brain evolved to be able to have the capacity to speak more than one language. Moreover, if executive functions play a role in the evolution of the human brain being able to hold this capacity.
[I had posted my blog before class, however, I decided to check this morning as a result of Prof Harnad's recent email and realized my 7b post was one of those that did not go through.]
The most compelling theory to me in terms of the evolution of cognition through the process of natural selection is the “fitness” approach, not only because it very closely resembles Darwin’s theory of evolution that highlights the importance of short term selection for long term evolution, but because it frames cognitive selection in a contemporary way. In other words, it takes a current example of a bird and analyzes the socio-ecological context, measures cognitive abilities, observes behaviour that are ecologically relevant to survival, and uses fitness (reproductive success or a measure of survival) as factors that are integrated together to determine selection underlying neurocognitive traits. This way, one can more easily run simulated experiments of the natural environment as opposed to examining cases from the past.
ReplyDeleteThe approaches discussed in this reading made me think about whether studying animal cognition has value towards understanding human cognition and how we can do the things we can do. I think both no and yes. The comparative approach, which looks at the evolution of traits by comparing existing species, is correlational and doesn’t delve into causal mechanisms. Similarly, the fitness approach looks at correlations between brain mechanisms and cognitive performance in animals, within contexts, but does not look into how these mechanisms work. However, the correlations provided through these approaches allow for similarity between brain structures to be determined, leading us to look deeper into the neurological aspects (e.g. neurotransmitter secretions), which takes us closer to understanding what produces certain things humans can do. While the approaches do not directly help in determining the easy problem, I think they may help indirectly.
ReplyDeleteAmong the many cognitive science perspectives learned up to now, evolutionary cognitive neuroscience and computational cognitive science are the most dominant ones. However, my question is that both of these are currently seen as too limited. It is impossible for computers to create new numbers and programs, yet evolutionary theory emphasizes the possibility of evolutionary development. At the same time, building on the fact that man has not yet defined clear emotions and behaviors on his own at present, symbolically logicalizing the entirety of the human body itself is an impossibility. Evolution itself simply cannot be fully statistical.
ReplyDeleteThe article begins by pointing out that "behaviour" means different things in different fields. To a cognitive scientists it refers to motor responses or actions while to an evolutionary ecologist it refers to more complex responses to social or ecological problems. Proximate studies seek to associate certain neural activity with certain behaviours (as defined in the first sense) and to more generally explain how cognition works in animal minds. Ultimate approaches care more about understanding the evolutionary history of traits and behaviours and what selective pressures made sure they ended up as part of our DNA today. The authors of this article advocate for a multidisciplinary approach to explaining animals doing capacities and the integration of evolutionary principles in cognitive science research. While I believe using multiple tools to solve a problem is almost always a good thing I do not believe the evolutionary perspective can shed much light on how we can do everything we can do, but perhaps more so on why we can.
ReplyDeleteThe conclusions about the role of evolution in cognitive processes in this reading was very much in line with things I remember learning about mate choice in a human decision-making in a class last year. If I remember correctly, a study found that men tend to make decisions on mates based solely on physical attractiveness, despite statements of desire for other qualities, and women chose men of similar attractiveness to them, based on their perception of their own attractiveness. This seems to match with the concepts of mate choice discussed here, in which females must take into account many environmental factors when choosing a mate because their parental investment is higher than males, so they must be choosier. I think the social aspect of self-perception in comparison to peers is a very interesting aspect to consider, as that seems to be unique to humans. The implications for the role of evolution in cognitive processes taking this ability to self-reflect into account is certainly interesting to consider.
ReplyDeleteThe reading focuses on various approaches to link the studies of evolution to cognition and looks to find an explanation for cognition. The one thought that remained in my mind throughout, especially on the selection section (though that may just be due to the examples given), is that there is a great focus on the biological functions and direct causation. This was sort of bringing us back to week 4 and how relevant it would be to know where exactly certain functions are located but is that what we are concerned with in Cogsci? It’s definitely one approach in reverse-engineering (knowing that a large brain-like thing is not required I guess) but neither approach give us a clear how we are able to do what we do and how to reproduce that.
ReplyDeleteThis reading is focused on the “fitness approach” and how it can be applied to both evolutionary and cognitive mechanisms to study proximate and ultimate underpinnings further to better understand the cognitive capacities of certain species. The fitness approach is focused on figuring out why specific cognitive capacities have evolved but cannot answer how these behaviours have evolved. Hence, the fitness approach can only solve half of the ‘easy problem’ of why we exhibit certain behaviours but cannot explain how or answer the ‘hard problem’ of why and how we feel.
ReplyDelete